Regulation of Medical Service Plans in California by Putra, Brian A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 20 | Issue 4 Article 8
1-1969
Regulation of Medical Service Plans in California
Brian A. Putra
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Brian A. Putra, Regulation of Medical Service Plans in California, 20 Hastings L.J. 1355 (1969).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol20/iss4/8
REGULATION OF MEDICAL SERVICE PLANS
IN CALIFORNIA
To anyone who has enjoyed the benefits of modern medical
science, it has become painfully obvious that the cost of medical care
has constantly risen at an astronomical rate. This is particularly true
in California.' Along with the significant rise in medical costs, there
has been a correspondingly large increase in the number of Califor-
nians who are participating in some type of health plan designed to
provide medical services at a reasonable price. 2 While most of these
health plans have been honestly run and eminently successful in pro-
viding adequate medical treatment while preventing financial dis-
aster, there have been enough instances of misconduct and of an in-
ability to provide paid for services to foster legislative concern.3
This note will analyze the manifestations of such legislative concern
as well as the past and present judicial treatment in California of
medical service plans which provide for prepaid medical service.
Classification--Service or Insurance
The number of Californians who have taken advantage of some
type of health plan is now over four million.4 Many of these health
plans are of the prepaid medical service variety, and generally oper-
ate as follows: A nonprofit corporation or unincorporated asso-
ciation enters into contracts with members of the public, usually
called subscribers, whereby the latter, on payment of a set periodic
fee, are entitled to receive certain types of treatment by physicians
who have agreed to look only to the prepaid fees for their compen-
sation.
Many courts have experienced difficulty in classifying prepaid
medical service contracts in order to determine which, if any, state
regulation is applicable to them.5 The issue most frequently raised
by the cases is "[w] hether grouping individuals together and plac-
ing periodic payments in a central fund so alters the nature of the
activity that what was once service can be said to be insurance."6
1 See Report of the Assembly Comm. on Finance and Insurance, 15
ASSEMBLY INTERIM COMM. REP. No. 24, at 96, 101 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Comm. REP. No. 24].
2 See Report of the Assembly Comm. on Finance and Insurance, 15
ASSEMBLY IRTERIM COMM. REP. No. 26, at 24, 25-26 [hereinafter cited as
Comm. REP. No. 26].
3 See id. at 24-36.
4 Id. at 26.
5 See, e.g., Maloney v. American Independent Medical & Health Ass'n,
119 Cal. App. 2d 319, 259 P.2d 503 (1953).
6 Peart & Hassard, The Organization of California Physicians' Service,
6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 565, 570 (1939) (emphasis added).
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The importance of this issue lies in the fact that if these plans are
designated insurance, they will be subject to regulation by the state's
insurance laws, which are generally more restrictive and comprehen-
sive than those governing health plans. For example, the California
Insurance Code7 requires the maintenance of large financial reserves
by plans subject to its provisions. The purpose of such reserves is to
guarantee that insurance plans will have adequate funds to meet the
financial obligations imposed upon them under their insurance con-
tracts, and to eliminate the possibility that those insured will have to
pay the cost of medical care out of their own pocket in the event the
insurer fails financially. If a medical service plan is required to main-
tain such large reserves, it will necessarily have to increase sub-
scription rates, and thereby defeat its primary aim of providing low
cost medical protection.
Judicial Tests
The California judiciary has consistently held that a health plan
must contain an element of indemnity to warrant classification as
insurance.8 This is in accord with. the statutory definition of insur-
ance contained in section 22 of the California Insurance Code: "Insur-
ance is a contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another
against loss, damage, or liability arising from a contingent, or un-
known event."9  Section 10272 of the Insurance Code 0 defines in-
demnity as "benefits promised," while section 2772 of the Civil Code"'
states: "Indemnity is a contract by which one engages to save an-
other from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties,
or of some other person."
In 1946, the California Supreme Court in California Physicians'
Service v. Garrison,12 held that the California Physicians' Service
(C.P.S.) was not engaged in the insurance business. C.P.S., a non-
profit corporation, was formed in 1939 by the California Medical
Association to provide medical care for people in low-income brack-
ets.13 Every physician licensed in California was invited to become a
professional member. Beneficiary members were enrolled pursuant
to contracts entered into by C.P.S. with lodges, clubs, employers and
others who had the means to collect monthly dues from their in-
7 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 700.01-.02.
8 See People ex Tel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 716,
441 P.2d 97, 99, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 587 (1968); California Physicians' Serv. v.
Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 803-04, 172 P.2d 4, 12 (1946).
9 CAr. INS. CODE § 22.
10 CAL. INS. CODE § 10272.
11 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772.
12 28 Cal. 2d 790, 172 P.2d 4 (1946).
13 Id. at 792, 172 P.2d at 6. For a comprehensive article about the birth
and structural organization of California Physicians' Service, see Peart &
Hassard, The Organization of California Physicians' Service, 6 LAw & CONTMMP.
PROS. 565 (1939).
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terested members and employees. The contracts expressly provided
that C.P.S. acted only as an agent for the professional members and
was not liable if any of the physicians breached their obligations.
The doctors agreed to look solely to the available funds for compen-
sation. In holding that C.P.S. was not subject to the regulations of
the Insurance Code, the court first said:
The business of the service lacks one essential element necessary to
bring it within the scope of the insurance laws, for clearly it assumes
no risk. Under the provisions of the contracts or group agreements, it
is a mere agent or distributor of funds. It does not promise the bene-
ficiary members that it will provide medical care; on the contrary,
"the services which are offered to ... beneficiary members of C.P.S.
are offered personally to said members by the professional members
of C.P.S .... 14
The court went on to formulate a new test for the classification of
prepaid medical service plans:
There is another and more compelling reason for holding that the
service is not engaged in the insurance business. Absence or presence
of assumption of risk or peril is not the sole test to be applied in de-
termining its status. The question, more broadly, is whether, looking
at the plan of operation as a whole, 'service' rather than 'indemnity'
is its principal object and purpose.15
The test enunciated in Garrison was significant in that it recog-
nized that "the element of assumption of risk or indemnification of
loss was not controlling" '16 in the classification of a contract as insur-
ance. The fact that a medical service plan incidentally offers some
insignificant indemnity features in addition to the provision of serv-
ices should not warrant the categorization of the whole plan as insur-
ance, necessitating the buildup of financial reserves, 1'7 and a corre-
sponding increase in subscription rates. Such a result would not be
justified by the elimination of the limited danger of personal liability
to the subscriber caused by minor indemnity features.
Regulation of Medical Service Plans
Prior to 1965
Before 1965, if a medical service plan was not classified as insur-
ance and regulated under the Insurance Code only three sections re-
mained applicable,' 8 and only two of these provided for any regu-
lation.19 Section 9200 of the Corporations Code20 (formerly section 593
14 California Physicians' Servw v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 804-05, 172 P.2d
4, 13 (1946) (quoting in part the C.P.S. contract).
15 Id. at 809, 172 P.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
16 Transportation Guar. Co. v. Jellins, 29 Cal. 2d 242, 249, 174 P.2d 625,
629 (1946).
17 CAL. INs. CODE § 700.01-.02.
18 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9200, 9201, 9505.
19 CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9201, 9505.
20 CAL. CoRp. CODE § 9200 reads as follows: "A nonprofit corporation
may be formed by three or more persons for any lawful purposes which do
MVay 1969] MVEDICAL SERVICE PLANS
of the Civil Code) provides that a nonprofit corporation may be formed
for the purposes of rendering services. Section 9201 of the Corpora-
tions Code21 (formerly section 593a of the Civil Code) permits a non-
profit corporation to be formed for the express purpose of defraying
the cost of medical services. Section 9201 places such a corporation
under the supervision of the board that licenses the professional
(physician) members of the corporation. In addition, section 9201
provides that the supervisory powers over nonprofit corporations hold-
ing property in trust, conferred by section 9505 of the Corporations
Code, on the Attorney General, should be applicable to section 9201
corporations as well.2 2
Whether a medical service plan, which was not classified as insur-
ance, could be regulated at all prior to 1965 depended upon whether
if' was organized and operated under section 9200 or section 9201. Since
section 9200 contains no regulatory provisions,23 nonprofit medical
service corporations organized under this section were subject to no
supervision. Section 9201 corporations were placed under the limited
supervision of a professional board and the Attorney General. The
professional board, under section 9201, and the Attorney General,
under sections 9201 and 9505, were given the power to supervise the
not contemplate the distribution of gains, profits, or dividends to the mem-
bers thereof and for which individuals lawfully may associate themselves,
such as religious, charitable, social, educational, or cemetery purposes, or
fdr'rendering services, subject to laws and regulations applicable to particular
classes of nonprofit corporations or lines of activity."
. "21"CAL. CoRp. CODE § 9201 reads as follows: "A nonprofit corporation may
be formed under this part for the purposes of defraying or assuming the cost
of professional services of licentiates under any chapter of Division 2 of the
Business and Professions Code or of rendering any such services, but it may
not engage directly or indirectly in the performance of the corporate pur-
poses or objects unless all of the following requirements are met: (a) At
least one-fourth of all licentiates of the particular profession become mem-
bers. (b) Membership in the Corporation and an opportunity to render
professional services upon a uniform basis are available to all licensed mem-
bers of the particular profession. (c) Voting by proxy and cumulative vot-
ing.are -prohibited. (d) A certificate is issued to the corporation by the
particular professional board whose licentiates have become members, find-
ing compliance with the requirements of subdivisions (a), (b), and (c).
"Any such nonprofit corporation shall be subject to supervision by the
particular professional board under which its members are ]inensed and shall
also be subject to Section 9505."
.22 CAL. CoRiP. CODE § 9505 (formerly CAL. Civ. CODE § 605) states: "A
nonprofit corporation which holds property subject to any public or chari-
table trust is subject at all times to examination by the Attorney General,
on behalf of the State, to ascertain the condition of its affairs and to what
extent, if at all, it may fail to comply with trusts which it has assumed or
may depart from the general purposes for which it is formed. In case of
any such failure or departure the Attorney General shall institute, in the
name of the State, the proceedings necessary to correct the noncompliance
or'departure."
23-See CAL. CORP. CoDE § 9200.
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service plan and see that there was compliance with the obligations
assumed. The extent of their authority, however, was not clearly
delineated.2 4
The California Supreme Court in California Physicians' Service
v. Garrison held that if a corporation was operating under section
9201, this fact was sufficient to exclude the corporation from the
provisions of the Insurance Code. In holding that C.P.S. was not an
insurer, the court stated:
[T~he Legislature by the enactment of section 593a of the Civil Code
[now section 9201 of the Corporations Code], with its express pro-
visions for limited regulation of nonprofit organizations of a profes-
sional character by the Attorney General and the particular pro-
fessional board, necessarily intended that such organization should
be exempt from regulation by the Insurance Commissioner. 25
The court noted that one of the reasons the corporate practice of
medicine had been held to be against public policy was that laymen
could obtain control of the corporation. The court believed that a
similar evil would result if C.P.S. were regulated by the extensive
provisions of the Insurance Code. Therefore, the court reasoned that
the legislature must have felt this factor outweighed any possible
public exploitation by such organizations and regarded as sufficient
the regulations of section 593a of the Civil Code.26
In Complete Service Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soci-
ety,2T the San Diego Medical Society contended that a nonprofit
medical service corporation could be formed only under section 9201
of the Corporations Code.28 Complete Service Bureau (C.S.B.) was
organized under the general nonprofit corporation law, section 9200
of the Corporations Code.29 The California Supreme Court, in reject:-
ing the Society's claim, stated:
Section 9201 did not purport to repeal any portion of section
9200. The language of section 9201 is permissive and not mandatory.
There would therefore seem to be no valid objection to the forma-
tion of a nonprofit medical service corporation under section 9200
as well as 9201.30
In so holding, the court disapproved dictum to the contrary in Ma-
loney v. American Independent Medical and Health Association.3 1
The court, in Complete Service Bureau, also noted that the Kaiser
24 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9201, 9505.
25 California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 810, 172 P.2d
4, 16, (1946).
26 Id. at 810, 172 P.2d at 17.
27 43 Cal. 2d 201, 272 P.2d 497 (1954).
28 Id. at 207-08, 272 P.2d at 501; Commn. REP. No. 26, supra note 2, at 29;
Comment, Medical Service Plans in California, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 674, 679 (1955).
29 Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 209, 272 P.2d 497, 502 (1954); Comment, Medical Service Plans in Cali-
fornia, 43 CAriw. L. REv. 674, 679 (1955).
30 Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 209, 272 P.2d 497, 502 (1954).
31 119 Cal. App. 2d 319, 324-25, 259 P.2d 503, 506 (1953).
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Foundation Health Plan and many fraternal and beneficial organi-
zations with medical service programs were incorporated under sec-
tion 9200 prior to the enactment of section 9201. It was reasoned that
the legislature could not have intended to eradicate existing section
9200 nonprofit medical service corporations when it enacted section
9201, since such an act might have been a violation of the constitu-
tional prohibition against the impairment of contracts.32  Further-
more, the court felt that the legislature was not thinking of fraternal
and other mutual nonprofit corporations when it enacted section
9201. According to the court, it would have been unreasonable for
the legislature to require these organizations to include as members
"one-fourth of all licentiates of the particular profession" or that these
limited groups must provide "an opportunity to render professional
services ... to all licensed members of the profession.! 3
The Complete Service Bureau case left a gaping hole in the
already inadequate state supervision of medical service plans. Under
the Garrison decision, a corporation organized under section 9201 of
the Corporations Code was not subject to regulation by the Insur-
ance Code.3 4 And under Complete Service Bureau, a medical serv-
ice plan need not even be formed under section 9201, so as to provide
the subscribers with the limited protection of that section. A service
plan could be organized and operated under section 9200,35 which
lacked any regulatory provisions, so that there was a complete absence
of state supervision over nonprofit service operations formed under
that section. 6
It should be noted that plans formed by unincorporated asso-
ciations were not governed by either 9200 or 9201, as both these
sections apply only to corporations.37 Thus, unless categorized as
insurance programs subject to the provisions of the Insurance Code,
unincorporated medical service plans were also free from all state con-
trol.
Prior to 1965, then, the only state regulation of medical service
plans which were not classified as insurance was the modicum of
control provided by sections 9201 and 9505 of the Corporations Code,
which gave a professional board and the Attorney General super-
visory powers stated in only the most general of terms.3 8
32 Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 209, 272 P.2d 497, 502 (1954).
33 Id. at 210, 272 P.2d at 502.
34 California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 810, 172 P.2d
4, 16 (1946).
35 Complete Serv. Bureau v. San Diego County Medical Soc'y, 43 Cal.
2d 201, 209, 272 P.2d 497, 502 (1954).
36 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 9200.
37 See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9200, 9201.
38 See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 9201, 9505.
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The Knox-Mills Plan Act
The California Legislature, in the early 1960's, began an extensive
study of medical service plans. It recognized that
[f ]rom the standpoint of State regulation, health plans existed
in a vacuum. It is true that all plans known to this committee are
incorporated under the General Nonprofit Corporation Law but its
provisions for regulation and surveillance are more illusory than
real, especially since the Supreme Court has held that the language
of § 9201-which is concerned specifically with health service or-
ganization-"is permissive and not mandatory."
... For years health plans have performed many of the services,
and operated in much the same manner, as insurers, yet they have
not been obliged to comply with the many provisions of the Insurance
Code nor with the regulations and orders of the Insurance Com-
missioner.39
In 1960, Assemblyman Cameron of the Finance and Insurance
Committee reported many complaints of misrepresentation and of an
inability to deliver promised services among some health service plans
in California.40 A subcommittee of the Finance and Insurance Com-
mittee was formed, and it began an inquiry into these plans.41
Through public hearings, this subcommittee received complaints of
misrepresentations, high-pressure sales tactics, loss of prepaid serv-
ices when plans failed financially, and a lack of adequate information
on subscriber benefits and their costs.4 One witness, the Assistant
Attorney General, stated that "[t]he people who have these claims
appear quite often to be on an economic level which makes it im-
practical for them to pursue any remedy of any kind to secure a
reasonable and impartial review of the action by which they are de-
prived of benefits."43
As a result of the Subcommittee's findings, the Finance and
Insurance Committee recommended the regulation of health service
plans for protection of the public.44  In 1965, the legislature re-
sponded by enacting the Knox-Mills Plan Act.45 The Act provides:
"Health care service plan" shall mean any form of organization
or any arrangement whereby any person undertakes responsibility
to provide, arrange for, pay for or reimburse any part of the cost of
any health care services for a consideration consisting in part of pre-
paid or periodic charges; but the provisions of this article shall not
apply to such a plan operated by an insurer, a nonprofit hospital
service plan, or a fraternal benefit society, while such plan is so
operated within the scope of the current certificate of authority issued
by the Insurance Commissioner, or to such a plan operated under a
trust fund negotiated by collective bargaining between an employer
and a labor organization. . .46
39 Com-m. REP. No. 26, supra note 2, at 28.
40 Cox'nw. REP. No. 24, supra note 1, at 118.
41 Comvi. REP. No. 26, supra note 2, at 30.
42 Id. at 30-32.
43 Id. at 33 (emphasis in original deleted).
44 See id. at 35.
45 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12530-39.
46 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12530 (a) (emphasis added).
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The effect of this legislation is to provide a measure of state
supervision over previously unregulated nonprofit medical service
corporations incorporated under section 9200 of the Corporations Code,
over nonprofit corporations operating under section 9201 of the same
Code,47 and over unincorporated associations or groups of natural
persons operating a medical care service plan on either a profit or
nonprofit basis. The Act prohibits untrue or misleading advertising 8
or solicitation 49 and deceptive membership contracts.50 The Attor..
ney General is given regulatory responsibility,5 ' as well as power to
enforce the provisions of the Act.52
The Knox-Mills Plan Act is a major step toward eliminating
many of the deceptive practices discovered by the Legislative Com-
mittee on Finance and Insurance, but it has raised some new problems.
The Act allows a plan to reimburse, and thus indemnify, 3 subscrib-
ers, but does not require the maintenance of financial reserves. In
the typical medical service plan which does not contain indemnity
features, subscribers are not in danger of being personally liable for
the costs of the services because they have paid their fees in advance,
and the physicians usually agree to look only to the standard rates
for their compensation. When an element of indemnity enters into
the plan, however, so does a risk of personal financial liability to the
subscriber, since if the plan becomes insolvent, it will be unable to
reimburse the subscriber for the medical expenses for which he is
personally liable. The Insurance Code, in contrast to the Knox-Mills
Act, alleviates this danger by requiring insurers to maintain large
financial reserves. 54 The questions posed by the Knox-Mills Plan Act
are therefore: At what point are the indemnity features so extensive
in a medical service plan that the whole plan should be classified as
insurance, thereby giving the subscribers the protection of the
financial reserves imposed by the Insurance Code; and did the legis-
lature intend to place any limit on the amount of indemnity permis-
sible in a medical service plan?
A New Classification Test
The questions raised by the Knox-Mills Plan Act were dealt with
in a recent case decided by the California State Supreme Court, People
47 While section 12530 (a) of the Government Code uses the phrase "any
person," a person can be a corporation. Pasadena v. Stimson, 91 Cal. 238,
248, 27 P. 604, 606 (1891); CAL. Civ. CODE § 14.
48 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12532 (a).
49 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12532(b).
50 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12532 (c).
51 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12537.
52 See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12533, 12534, 12535, 12538.
53 See People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 717, 441
P.2d 97, 100, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1968).
54 See CAL. INs. CODE §§ 700.01-.02.
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ex rel. Roddis v. California Mutual Association,5  which caused a
radical change in the classification of medical service plans. An ac-
tion was brought by the Insurance Commissioner to restrain the
California Mutual Association (C.M.A.) from conducting an insur-
ance business without procuring a certificate of authorization. 56 C.
M.A. contended it was a health care service plan operating pursuant
to the Knox-Mills Plan Act.57 The subscribing members paid C.M.A.
an annual consideration, plus a small monthly assessment which
varied with the amount of medical expenses paid by C.M.A. The
subscribers were entitled to benefits of up to $1500 for hospitalizaton
and up to $500 for medical and surgical expenses. C.M.A. originally
had contracts with 17 doctors, who agreed to look exclusively to
C.M.A. for payment of the present fee, but the doctors retained the
privilege of charging the subscriber an amount in excess of this fee.
Most of the subscribers were treated by physicians associated with
the San Bernardino Foundation for Medical Care and the Riverside
Foundation. C.M.A. later terminated the San Bernardino contracts
and procured new contracts with 38 doctors who were to receive pay-
ment only from C.M.A. C.M.A. also had contracts with seven doctors
who did not limit themselves solely to CM.A. as their source of pay-
ment; likewise, no hospital so limited itself. C.M.A. paid for serv-
ices rendered by doctors chosen by subscribers in areas where it lacked
medical service contracts.
The court first noted that a necessary element of insurance- is
that of indemnity. It then said:
The [Knox-Mills Plan Act] permits a health care service plan to
"reimburse" a member and thus indicates that service plans may
include some indemnity features, but by excluding an "insurer"5 8 from
the definition of a "health care service plan" the Legislature has
evinced an intention to limit the extent of indemnity features per-
missible.5 9
The court proceeded to develop a new test for classifying a medical
service plan either as insurance or as a health care plan under the
Knox-Mills Plan Act:
[W] here indemnity is a significant financial proportion of the busi-
ness, the organization must be classified as an "insurer" for the
55 68 A.C. 713, 441 P.2d 97, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
56 CAL. INS. CODE § 700 provides for the issuance of such a certificate.
57 The Knox-Mills Plan Act is found in CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12530-39.
58 Such exclusion is provided for by CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12530 (a).
59 People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 717-18, 441
P.2d 97, 100, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1968). The court also cited Comm. REP.
No. 26, supra note 2, at 26, in which the committee stated that since Blue
Cross was technically insurance, and since the report did not deal with in-
surance, then Blue Cross's estimated 2,090,000 insureds therefore should be
added to the insurance category. Blue Cross provides service on an indem-
nity basis, and the court felt its exclusion from the Act's proposed coverage
indicated an intent on the part of the committee to limit allowable indemnity
features. People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 718 n.3,
441 P.2d 97, 100 n.3, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 n.3 (1968).
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purposes of the Knox-Mills Plan Act ....
We realize that this determination involves balancing the indem-
nity aspects against the direct service aspects of the business, but
only in the context of the plan as a whole can it be determined
whether the indemnity feature is so significant as to warrant im-
posing the Insurance Code financial reserve requirements. Nor,
should this requirement unreasonably restrict the development of
new health plans or impinge on the growth of existing plans.60
It could very well be argued that Roddis is an erroneous inter-
pretation of the Knox-Mills Plan Act. The legislature was certainly
aware of the fact that many existing medical service plans were similar
to insurance and contained indemnity as well as direct service fea-
tures, and it is also clear that the legislature did not feel that the
presence of an element of indemnity warranted placing the entire
plan under the Insurance Code, with its financial reserve require-
ments."' This was manifested by an express allowance of indemnity
features in health care service plans, without mention of a quantitative
limitation.62
It is also clear that the legislature wished to encourage rather
than hinder the development of new medical care plans. 3 Yet, despite
the court's assurance that the Roddis decision would not so hinder
new plans,64 there is a very real danger that it will. If the indemnity
features of the service plan are a "significant financial proportion of
the business," then the entire plan must comply with the financial re-
serve requirements of the Insurance Code.6 5 But the reserve require-
ments are inconsistent with the nature and purpose of medical
service plans, and the legislature recognized this fact by not includ-
ing any requirements for reserves in the new legislation. The Su-
preme Court of California has itself recognized the inapplicability of
the reserve requirements to those service plans. "[B]y the very
nature of its operations, the service could not accumulate vast re-
serves. The flow of funds from patient to physician primarily is on a
00 People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 719, 441
P.2d 97, 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1968) (emphasis added).
61 See CoMM. REP. No. 26, supra note 2, where the committee said:
"[T]he direct service feature that is becoming an increasingly significant
factor calls for special consideration. To assert that health plan contracts
constitute insurance, pure and simple, because of indemnification features
is analogous to insisting that porpoises are fish simply because they are found
in the same environment.
"This committee therefore recommends that the dual nature of health
plans be statutorily recognized while perceiving their essence: their real.
purpose in preserving good health and preventing ill health." Id. at 39.
62 See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12530 (a).
63 COMM. REP. No. 26, supra note 2, at 36, where it was said: "[C]are
must be taken to always make it possible for new plans to enter the stage,
for health is a commodity that has too few purveyors ... "
64 People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 719, 441
P.2d 97, 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1968).
65 See id.
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monthly basis of pay-as-you-go and to require reserves would be a
useless and uneconomic waste." 66 It is obvious that if medical serv-
ice plans are required to maintain the substantial reserve require-
ments of the Insurance Code, they will necessarily be compelled to
raise the cost of the benefits provided, which will defeat their aim of
providing inexpensive medical service.
The new test of the Roddis case, however, may also be viewed as
being complementary to the Knox-Mills Plan Act in the sense that both
are designed to achieve the legislative purpose of procuring protection
for subscribers to medical service plans. The Roddis case is simply a
judicial recognition of the fact that where indemnity features exist,
there also exists the possibility of personal liability to the subscriber
for medical costs, and that this risk is one that can be eliminated
by requiring an insurer to maintain adequate financial reserves.T To
the extent that the Knox-Mills Plan Act would allow this risk to
continue by permitting significant indemnity features, it would fail
in its task of protecting the public. It must be kept in mind that the
purpose of these health plans is essentially that of providing services
which are usually prepaid. The end result is medical care which
is not only relatively inexpensive, but also guaranteed. To allow an
infusion of indemnity provisions into medical plans would be to deny
the public the protection of guaranteed medical benefits. And since
public protection is the principal goal of the Knox-Mills Plan Act, it
is submitted that the Roddis court was correct in refusing to allow
unlimited indemnity provisions in a medical service plan.
Conclusion
As yet, no acceptable device has been found to assure the con-
tinued fiscal stability of medical service plans with indemnity features
"[c]onsonant with the objective of all reputable plans to pare costs
and hold to the minimum expenses so as to provide health care at the
lowest possible rate for subscribers."68
A more viable approach than the compromise of the Roddis case
would be the enactment of new legislation aimed specifically at plans
incorporating both service and indemnity elements. Such legislation
66 California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790, 811, 172 P.2d
4, 17 (1946). See also Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir.
1939), in which the court stated: "It is not the function or purpose of Group
Health [a medical service plan] to pile up vast accumulations of capital to
await the needs of a distant day; it is rather to keep a steady flow of funds,
with as small a margin as possible, running from patient to physician as
nearly contemporaneously with the reverse flow of service from physician
to patient as can be .... To require it to maintain a guarantee fund... would
be to direct funds from its primary purpose and keep them in idleness to
no end of security for its members." Id. at 251.
67 See People ex rel. Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 68 A.C. 713, 719,
441 P.2d 97, 101, 68 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1968).
68 Com¢nm . RE. No. 26, supra note 2, at 36.
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should contain regulatory provisions at least as comprehensive as
those of the Knox-Mills Plan Act. There should be provisions re-
quiring that advertising and solicitation be completely candid and
forthright. It should be required that the membership contract set
out explicitly what services are to be provided, the exact cost of such
services, and the limits of the subscriber's personal liability for serv-
ices provided under the plan. A registration requirement for all
medical service plans incorporating an indemnity element should be
included, thereby placing before the public eye all pertinent infor-
mation concerning the plan's financial structure, benefit provisions,
and expense.
Finally, there should be a provision requiring the maintance of
the minimal financial reserves necessary for that particular plan to
ensure that those subscribers relying on the indemnity features of
the plan will not be endangered by personal liability for medical ex-
penses. There should be a predetermined formula whereby a cer-
tain percentage of each dollar of indemnity benefits provided must
be placed in a reserve fund. The percentage amount should not be
higher than is absolutely necessary for the subscriber's protection. By
applying this formula to each individual plan, an adequate financial
reserve could be maintained with a minimum increase in the cost of
the service plan.
A state officer should be empowered to scrutinize the operations
of these service-indemnity plans and to enforce their compliance
with the provisions of the new law. It would be desirable to maintain
a continuity of authority over all service plans which do not fall under
the scope of the Insurance Code. Since the Attorney General already
is vested with supervisory power regarding plans regulated by the
Knox-Mills Plan Act, he would be the appropriate state official to
enforce the new legislation.
The rapid growth of medical service plans has brought low-cost
medical protection within the reach of millions of Californians. But
such subscribers must be protected from the possibility of abuse of
the plans inherent in the difficulty and the undesirability of subject-
ing them to close regulatory scrutiny. The Knox-Mills Plan Act has
created such protection with regard to many existing plans. The en-
actment of the proposals suggested here would contribute greatly to
the completion of this protection.
Brian A. Putra*
* Member, Third Year Class
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